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STEPHEN D. GINGERICH

Prefatory Conventions and Invention:
Rereading Borges’s Prologue to

La invention de Morel
Prologues traditionally present works through a series of conventional gestures:
introducing the author, providing contextual information and otherwise preparing a reader for proper understanding ofthe work. In this sense, they appear to
reinforce a classic distinction between the philosophical text, whose words efface
themselves in the act of understanding and the literary text, which resists such
neglect oftextuality and demands rereading. In a variety ofways throughout his
work, Borges questions the neat distinction between literature and philosophy,
and “Prefatory Conventions and Invention” examines how he does this in his
prologues. After examining theory of the prologue in Borges, Gerard Genette’s
Paratexts, andJacques Derrida’s “Outworks, ” this articlefocuses on Borges’s prologue to La invention de Morel, showing how it both conforms to philosophical
task ofdelivering knowledge and demands multiple readings in the manner ofa
literary text. Following apparently accidental details of the prologue, and building on the work ofprevious critics, Ipropose that we view the borgesian text not
as a fusion of literature and philosophy but as a textual movement or passage
back andforth between two distinct types ofdiscourse.

In the epilogue to El libro de arena, Borges warns that “Prologar
cuentos no leidos aun es tarea casi imposible, ya que exige el analisis
de tramas que no conviene anticipar” (Obras completas III: 82). The
Obras completas allow us to enumerate Borges’s prologues for his own
books (whose stories he had not only written but also, presumably,
read) and add to the list those written on behalf of other storytellers
and published in Prologos in 1975 (Obras completas IV). If we take into
account the volume of prologues that were featured in the 1988 collection Biblioteca personal: Prologos (at the end of Obras completas IV)
and the handful of prefatory texts included in the two-volume Textos

recobrados in 2001, we can see that the “near impossible task” hardly
deterred Borges. As he acknowledged in his 1940 prologue to Adolfo
Bioy Casares’s La invention de Morel, his friend’s novel counts among
those works that should constrain a prologuist to avoid untimely revelation, engendering a “temor de incurrir en prematuras o parciales
revelaciones” (vii).1 The novel’s anonymous narrator (and, implicitly,
the fictitious editor who provides footnotes to the narrator’s text) present the text as a journal of his efforts to understand a series of strange
phenomena—among them, partygoers dancing in a rainstorm and
swimming happily in a snake-infested pool—that he characterizes on
page one as an “adverso milagro” (1). A single revelation accounts for
all of the strange events about two-thirds of the way through the novel
(60), and the final third of the book tells of the narrator’s somewhat
bizarre response to this unexpected factor. Borges’s prologue does not
spoil the experience for the reader, although he describes how Bioy “despliega una Odisea de prodigios que no parecen admitir otra clave que
la alucinacion o que el simbolo, y plenamente los descifra mediante un
solo postulado fantastico, pero no sobrenatural” (vii). However, a close
examination of Borges’s prologue shows that it adds to the conventional
prelusory gestures many elements that can only be understood when
reread in light of the novel as a whole. For El libro de arena, Borges apparently chose to avoid the problem of untimely disclosure by placing
his commentary after the text proper, but he more often chose to face
head-on the conflicting demands on the prologuist, providing readers
with a wary elucidation of stories whose details ought not be betrayed.
Borges’s prologue to La invention refuses to acquiesce to the subordinate
and exterior role often assumed for this kind of text, forging instead a
space of encounter for the inventive realm of fiction and the cognitive,
argumentative forum of critical discourse. Borges scholars surely agree
that his Ficciones create such a space, but we may not yet recognize the
extent to which some of his prologues accomplish this, too.
I will be analyzing the preface to a book, considering the novel
La invention de Morel as a context for understanding its prologue, rather
than the other way around. While this might seem a perverse task, my
analysis also takes as its object a type of text that has been characterized
as eccentric. Borges’s “Prologo de prologos” opens the 1975 collection
of prefatory texts that appear without the books for which they served
as introductions. If the volume itself were not unlikely enough, Borges

displays some ambivalence on the issue of prologue theory, noting, first,
that there is as yet no theory of prologues, and, furthermore, that we
apparently have no need of one, since we all know perfectly well what
they are. Finally, no more deterred by the unnecessary than the near
impossible, he sets out to provide just such a theory (Obras completas
IV: 14).
Borges’s characteristic dismissal of his own discourse immediately becomes caught up in his abyssal irony when he notes that writers
of prologues often settle for careless, impulsive, or trite “oratoria de sobremesa” (Obras completas IV: 14). Should we laud his own prologue for
adhering to the genre or scorn it for its casual impetuousness? Borges
goes on to compare the prologue to a “panegirico funebre” that includes
“hiperboles irresponsables” (Obras completas IV: 14). As I will mention, these characterizations do not simply describe how not to write
a prologue, but in fact play a role in Borges’s presentation of his friend
Bioy’s first novel. However, Borges then notes that some prologues
stand out above the “forma subalterna del brindis” and become “una
especie lateral de la critica” (Obras completas IV: 14). As such, he adds,
these texts have the potential to move from the outside of the book to
the inside, to become a “parte inseparable del texto” (Obras completas
IV: 14). Alongside the custom of casual, laudatory remarks exists an
alternate practice, the prologue that would provide a sort of analysis
and interpretation. Such a commentary, as we have already seen, might
adapt itself to its position in and before the object of analysis. In fact,
Borges stresses that these good prologues—his examples are all, like the
epilogue to El libro de arena, written by the author of the work—become a part of the work they introduce. Although it casts suspicion on
all prefatory texts, Borges’s “Prologo de prologos” would presumably
be one of these good prologues. It begins by denying the use in its own
title of a (hyperbolic) “locucion hebraica superlativa” analogous to the
Bible’s Song ofSongs (Obras completas IV: 14), that is, by insisting this is
not a “Prologue of Prologues,” and turns out to offer not only a “Prologue for Prologues” but a “Prologue about Prologues.”2
Since the “Prologo de prologos” appeared, Gerard Genette has
published a theory of the prologue as one of a collection of elements
he calls “paratexts,” which “(enable) a text to become a book and to be
offered as such to its readers and, more generally, to the public” (1). His
Paratexts: Thresholds ofInterpretation (originally published in French as

Seuils in 1987) provides an important survey of the variety of prologues
and establishes terminology that can help us maintain a clear critical
view of the topic, alongside Borges’s possibly idiosyncratic one.3 To begin with, his first of three chapters devoted to prologues (easily the paratext that requires the most comment and analysis) receives the name
“The Prefatorial Situation” and maintains that no strict difference exists
between introductions, prefaces, prologues, forewords, etc. (161). The
essential role of these anterior paratexts is to spark interest and guide
the reader’s interpretation, expressed in the epithet “to get the book read
and to get the book read properly” (197). For this reason, Genette even
includes epilogues and other posterior paratexts as part of the “prefatorial situation” (161). Though Genette considers the whole range of
prologues—including playful fictional ones and the “disavowing” ones
that seem to assert little but the pointlessness of a prologue—the most
important distinction is between autographic prefaces, which receive
their own chapter, “Functions of the Original Preface,” and allographic,
which are discussed along with some of the stranger varieties of “authorial” prefaces in “Other Prefaces, Other Functions.” Genette confirms,
then, Borges’s point that allographic prologues function as tribute and/
or critical intervention. He also recognizes that prefaces sometimes lose
their paratextual status to become part of the text itself (177). Borges’s
examples in the “Prologo de prologos” and Genette’s in Paratexts suggest
that this phenomenon only seems to occur in the case of autographic
prefaces, but Borges’s prologue for Bioy Casares may qualify as an exceptional case. In a final connection to Borges, Genette actually cites
the epilogue to El libro de arena to contend that the preface writer suffers from “an unbalanced and even shaky situation of communication”
since he comments upon a text as yet unfamiliar to the reader (237). To
the extent that this asymmetry is caused by reader and writer possessing
different knowledge about a prefaced text, it is remediable by placing
the prefatory text at the end of the book. In part, then, the strangest
feature of the anticipatory preface consists in its most ordinary characteristic, its position before the text.
For Genette, this peculiarity of the preface also gets bound up
with that most deviant of communicative acts, literature. In a preface,
the author is “least the creator” and “most the literary man” (292). For
Genette, the writing of introductory paratexts is the most rigorously
literary practice because of its inherent ambivalence: it might serve as

a stimulant or an impediment to the text proper; it might, as it were,
move in and out of the text, determining interpretation or remaining
indifferent; and it might even be read attentively or ignored completely.
Referring to his earlier analysis of Borges’s “Prologo de prologos,” Genette describes a “prefatorial malaise” that often overcomes the writer
of prefaces (275). This is “a kind of generic hyperconsciousness”: “no
one writes a preface without experiencing the more or less inhibiting
feeling that what’s most obvious about the whole business is that he is
engaged in writing a preface” (275). He quotes at length from Barthes’s
“veritable little organon of the allographic preface,” which situates a
preface-writer as a third position between reader and writer (275). Being neither the reader nor the writer, the writer of the allographs preface seems completely superfluous. As Genette says elsewhere, the reader
is “poised for an imminent reading of the text [proper] . . . , without
which its [the prefatory text’s] preparatory or retrospective comments
would be largely meaningless and, naturally, useless” (194). The writer
of the preface cannot expect to be completely understood, at least not
yet. Unless we are reading a particular text by Borges, there is not a prologue to the prologue that inspires and guides its reader. Moreover, the
prologuist’s best efforts can only be appreciated if the reader performs
the unnatural act of turning back after completing the book. Structurally, then, the preface embodies the anxiety of serious writers, unsure
of whether their texts deserve the status of literary work or merely serve
a secondary, ancillary function, of whether they are original or mere
footnotes to literary history.
Borges’s prologue to Roberto Godel’s Nacimiento delfuego (from
1932) also includes relevant comments on the inherent strangeness of
the prologue. “Un libro (creo) debe bastarse,” he says; however, Borges
notes that a “convencion editorial” declares that the book is not enough
until it includes a prologue (Obras completas IV: 78). The publisher
prefers to introduce a new work with an “estimulo en letra bastardilla
que corre el peligro de asemejarse a esa otra indispensable pagina en
bianco que precede a la falsa caratula” (Obras completas IV: 78). Borges
mocks editors for believing the prologue should be distinguished from
the work proper by something as grossly material as ink and typeset.
Ironically, he also suggests that a prologue’s text can just as easily appear
as blank as the flyleaves that separate the book itself from its cover and
thereby from its physical and spiritual exterior. The risk he will run, he

says—“arriesgo, pues, las solicitaciones que siguen”—has to do with
producing a superfluous or meaningless speech, and he assumes this risk
in accordance with “la insegura autoridad que nos da despachar un prologo” (Obras completas IV: 78). Working with authority and insecurity
at once, Borges commends Godel’s poems to the reader, who possesses
a combination of traits that is equally oxymoronic: “se que tambien
intimaran contigo, preciso aunque invisible lector” (Obras completas
IV: 79). Individual readers can be identified precisely, in spite of their
invisibility. Borges’s preface might fall outside of the book or, as he says
in the “Prologo de prologos,” be absorbed into it. A preface puts readers
and writers both in an awkward position.
Although we might make much of the malaise in Borges’s
“temor de incurrir en prematuras o parciales revelaciones” (vii, my emphasis), we can read the prologue to La invencion in perfectly conventional terms, that is, as publisher-mandated advocacy for the author and
guidance for the reader. Although he provides almost no biographical
information on Bioy Casares, Borges praises the work and, by implication, its author. After insisting on the high degree of conscious artistry
involved in writing a “novela de peripecias” (v), Borges attributes this
mastery to La invention when he compares it to other celebrated works:
“considero que ninguna otra epoca posee novelas de tan admirable
argumento como The turn of the screw, como Der Prozess, como Le Voyageur sur la terre, como esta que ha logrado, en Buenos Aires, Adolfo
Bioy Casares” (vi).4 The book not only takes a coveted place alongside
two undisputed classics, it also practically inaugurates a new style in
literature written in Spanish, which he calls “imaginacion razonada”
(vii). Perhaps we should read this compliment as one of the “hiperboles irresponsables” that Borges will later, in the “Prologo de prologos,”
recognize as a common characteristic of the genre (Obras completas IV:
14). The final words of the prologue hyperbolize farther: “He discutido
con su autor los pormenores de su trama, la he releido; no me parece
una imprecision o una hiperbole calificarla de perfecta” (vii). How better to praise writers than to call their work perfect?
In a 1931 essay in Discusion (included in Obras completas I),
Borges focuses directly on the concept of perfection, lending it a meaning that would mitigate the laudatory nature of this attribution to Bioy’s
novel. “La supersticiosa etica del lector” begins by arguing against a
“supersticion del estilo” (attributed more to the critic than to the reader

mentioned in the title, a reader he wants to understand “en el sentido
ingenuo de la palabra”; Obras completas I: 214) and goes on to describe
an ineffable quality in texts that causes them to transcend the time and
place of their production. Literature has a particular temporality, but it
also exists in the medium of language, which has an independent his
torical character. Borges warns of the precarious nature of perfection,
joking that he knows of no literary work whose formal flawlessness has
rendered it “invulnerable e indestructible” (Obras completas I: 215).
In fact, he says, “la pagina de perfection, la pagina de la que ninguna
palabra puede ser alterada sin dano, es la mas precaria de todas. Los
cambios del lenguaje borran los sentidos literales y los matices; la pagina
‘perfecta’ es la que consta de esos delicados valores y la que con facilidad
mayor se desgasta” (Obras completas I: 216). A text’s formal perfection
at the moment of production can be determined, detected, and even,
perhaps, produced, but there is no telling whether a language’s subse
quent development will preserve the formal characteristic of perfection
to which the literary text initially conformed. Ironically, the unrelenting
evolution of language destroys perfect writing more than it does other
types of discourse. Other, imperfect pages live on by some mysterious
power: “la pagina que tiene vocation de inmortalidad puede atravesar
el fuego de las erratas, de las versiones aproximativas, de las distraidas
lecturas, de las incomprensiones, sin dejar el alma en la prueba” (Obras
completas I: 216). He goes on to characterize the translations of Don
Quijote as ghosts haunted by the Spanish text, attesting to the life of
the original with lives of their own, “el fantasma aleman o escandinavo
o indostanico del Quijote” (Obras completas I: 216). Borges implies that
wise writers do not strive for perfection but resign themselves to the
hope that some mysterious quality in their work might live on, nur
tured by an unforeseen imbalance in the work. Perfect works will surely
become imperfect, while imperfect works have the chance for survival
that is often, superstitiously, ascribed to works praised as perfect.
In a final paragraph of “La supersticiosa etica del lector,” Borges
remarks that he has reread what he wrote, suggesting once more that he
had this essay in mind when he wrote the prologue to La invention. It
occurs to him that, in contrast to music and architecture or sculpture
{marmot}, “la literatura es un arte que sabe profetizar aquel tiempo en
que habra enmudecido, y encarnizarse con la propia virtud y enamorarse de la propia disolucion y cortejar su fin” (Obras completas I: 217).

Only when Borges becomes a reader of his own writing does he arrive at
his most general formulation. In its “saber profetizar” (Obras completas
I: 217), literature anticipates the reader’s journey; it foresees how the
reader will pass from ignorance to knowledge of a work, in the same
way the text passes from initial publication to incorporation into the
canon. But it also anticipates its own disappearance; the very forces that
make a work immortal foretell its passage into translation and new edi
tions, a sort of end—transformation into an Other—that amounts to
its survival. Prefatory texts, as I have pointed out, are peculiar, but so
is the exceptional writing known as literature. Reading the prologue to
La invention de Morel with “La supersticiosa etica del lector” claims that
perfection leaves room for improvement, since the perfect inevitably
becomes imperfect and the imperfect survives intact.
Genette also says that prefaces offer guidance for understanding the work, and Borges’s prologue provides this, too. His description
of Bioy’s novel as “imaginacion razonada” (vii), like the attribution of
perfection, gives the reader a general orientation toward the book, considering the interplay of reason and fantasy, the way fantasy is guided by
rationality rather than mere whimsy. He provides similar instructions,
in fact, when he indicates that Bioy Casares’s departures from reality are
limited to a single “postulado fantastico” (vii). Readers will be attentive
to this, waiting for the revelation that fits the pieces together. Borges
reinforces his judgment by claiming to have read the book twice (“la
he releido”; vii), the second time to confirm that what leads up to the
revelation does not stray from the book’s overall architecture. Guidance does not limit itself to identifying beforehand the dynamic of the
work, but also provides clues to its understanding. Borges’s prologue
prepares us for Bioy’s poetics, but also for his ideas. Returning a second
time to the prologue’s beginning, readers will note that it presents itself
as an explicitly philosophical argument, a polemic against claims that
the possibilities for narrative invention are on the verge of exhaustion.
Even more than before, Borges adopts a philosophical stance, going so
far as to acknowledge at one point his commitment to both theoretical
and empirical argumentation (“he alegado un motivo de orden intelectual; hay otros de caracter empirico”; vi). Borges summarizes Jose
Ortega y Gasset’s claim that a novel focused on unforeseen events has
lost its appeal to serious readers, quoting specific pages he attributes
to La deshumanizacion del arte: “es muy diffcil que hoy quepa inventar

una aventura capaz de interesar a nuestra sensibilidad superior” (qtd. in
Prologo, v). Its theme suggests and I can confirm that the quote comes
from Ideas sobre la novela, although a 1925 edition combines these two
texts, making this a matter of bibliographic imprecision or oversight
rather than an outright error. Borges reiterates, integrating a reference to
the title at hand along with another quote from Ortega: “esa invention
‘es practicamente imposible’” (v). Borges says that he and the author of
La invention de Morel “disienten,” that they disagree with the renowned
Spanish man of letters, and that this prologue has the task of summarizing “los motivos de ese disentimiento” (v).
Borges begins with a simple, if not simplistic, empirical argument: he names a series of authors and books that manage to catch the
interest of what Ortega y Gasset refers to as an “sensibilidad superior”
(qtd. in Prologo v), like Borges’s own. A double irony operates here,
since neither the form nor the content of the argument would satisfy an
empiricist. Borges names a series of contemporary novels, as if a simple
display of an adequate number of specimen could disprove the extinction of inventive, intellectually satisfying fiction. In fact, naming The
Turn of the Screw, Der Prozess, and Le Voyageur sur la terre along with
Bioy Casares’s novel could put into question Borges’s sensibility instead
of establishing definitively the fact that interesting novels continue to
be written. His first two examples are indeed canonical writers—Henry
James and Franz Kafka—although they are certainly not thought of as
writers of adventure stories. Written in French by the American expatriate Julien Green, Le Voyageur has not really stood the test of time; it tells
of a young man in a university town in the United States South who
appears to have committed suicide. Though the motive remains elusive, he may have been possessed by a spirit, insane, hounded to death
by a ghost, or simply the victim of a cruel joke on the part of a fellow
student. Choosing three examples of writers with a tension between
linguistic and political identity (James being an American in Great
Britain and Kafka a German-speaking Jew in the heart of Bohemia),
Borges seems to dare posterity to deny these writers canonical status.
Still, although an empirical argument appears to suffice to dismiss
Ortega’s assertion that the novel is in its death throes, Borges makes a
much more compelling theoretical argument.
Borges attacks Ortega on two fronts. The first involves the way,
for Ortega, the psychological novel displaces and kills off the adventure

novel. Borges acknowledges the philosophical value of the psychological
novel, saying that “los rusos y los discipulos de los rusos han demostrado hasta el hastio que nadie es imposible” (v). Restricting it to the realm
of fictional characters, on whom the psychological novel concentrates its
effort, Borges says that all human types have been represented in literary
“informes” (v). Moreover, the psychological novel, with its aspiration
to realism, encourages “vana precision” by justifying it as “verosimil”
(vi). In contrast to the pretended contribution to documenting human
diversity, Borges and Bioy propose the “intrinseco rigor” of the adventure novel: “es un objeto artificial que no sufre ninguna parte injustificada” (vi). If science is defined by the rigor of its method rather than
its subject matter, the adventure novel is more serious than psychology.
Borges’s pronouncement might seem, on a first reading, to disparage
the psychological novel, but the reader familiar with La invention de
Morel will recognize the format of the “informe” and, with a little effort,
the plot. “Nadie es imposible,” Borges says, and he gives the following
examples: “suicidas por felicidad, asesinos por benevolencia, delatores
por fervor o por humildad” (v). While Borges suggests that this investigative quality might be burdensome in the psychological novel, he
acknowledges that it can also exist in other novels. Both the narrator
and Morel, after all, commit suicide to spend eternity with Faustine.
Morel kills a group of his own friends in the conviction that they will
relive the week of happy leisure ad infinitum. His act can be understood
as both humble and authoritarian, as he asks for neither reward from
his beneficiaries nor permission from his victims. Borges thus insists
that psychology in itself fails to provide the key to innovation in the
novel.5 If La invention deserves our interest and exemplifies invention in
general, it does so in spite of its repetition of psychological themes supposedly exhausted by “los rusos y los discipulos de los rusos” (vi). Such
a fearless approach to repetition or appropriation of previously used
plots should not surprise those familiar with Borges’s Historia universal
de la infiamia, with its retelling of stories whose source material is openly
acknowledged in an “Indice de las fuentes” (Obras completas I: 337).
The rigor of the “novela de peripecias” distances it from the
childishness that Ortega attributes to it (v), for it requires a degree of
technical mastery that Borges does not see in Proust, the novelist whom
Ortega championed as “el hecho literario de mayor trascendencia en
este tiempo ultimo” (qtd. in Craig 452). In an apparent joke, Borges

says, “hay paginas, hay capitulos de Marcel Proust que son inaceptables
como invenciones: a los que, sin saberlo, nos resignamos como a lo inslpido y ocioso de cada dia” (vi). Instead of engaging in a direct critique
of the mimetic ideal of literature, Borges pushes it to its logical limit, or
rather, claims that Proust does so by creating a work whose imitation of
life integrates its most negligible and tedious moments. Proust becomes
like Funes el Memorioso, who on two or three occasions reconstructs
an entire day in his memory before realizing that, since he must devote
a whole day to such a project, he has better things to do (Obras completas I: 523). In contrast to the resignation Borges associates with the
psychological novel a la Proust, the adventure novel inspires the reader
and solicits attention to every last detail.
Nonetheless, Borges’s reading of La invencion not only makes it
an example of psychological insight but also a participant in philosophical debates. Although Ortega was on his way to being considered the
foremost Spanish philosopher of the twentieth century, his expert philosophical opinion coincided not only with the opinion of Robert Louis
Stevenson but with the common, public, low-brow point of view that
Ortega so famously disdained in La Espana invetebrada. In short, the
idea that “there is nothing new under the sun” (in the words of Ecclesiastes) is itself hardly original, and Ortega’s attempt to use philosophy
to steer the novel towards psychology appears to offer a naive, scientific
solution for an age-old literary problem.6 Later in the prologue, Borges
connects the novel laconically to two ancient philosophers, and an essayist and a poet from the nineteenth century. After recalling his intention to avoid giving away the plot, Borges says, “Basteme declarar que
Bioy renueva literariamente un concepto que San Agustin y Origenes
refutaron, que Louis Aguste Blanqui razono y que dijo con musica
memorable Dante Gabriel Rossetti . . .” (vii). Minimal research will
turn up Augustine’s and Origen’s interest in reincarnation and Blanqui’s
discussion of the idea of eternal return in L’Eternitepar les astres. We can
imagine a reader, or a rereader, bringing this new information to bear
on the interpretation of the novel, and on the prologue, where the idea
of a soul’s return is echoed in the first line of the Rossetti verse, “I have
been here before” (vii). Bioy’s novel “renueva . . . un concepto” (vii),
says Borges, that has been both refuted and supported by philosophers.
Borges follows the convention of providing an interpretation by way of
a conceptual indication. Again, this lends the novel a seriousness that

ought not be associated with other adventure novels, probably, at least,
novels like Treasure Island. In doing so, he implies that innovation is
renovation, a certain kind of repetition from a past already constituted
by a series of inventive reiterations. Moreover, Borges surely noticed
that this reiteration was simultaneously the theme and its manifestation.
The theme of return speaks about the very thing it performs.
The rhapsodic function of Borges’s prologue—centered on canonicity and perfection—overlaps with the exegetical function, attributing to Bioy a defense of inventive narrative and the theme of cyclical
time. Likewise, the prologue could be taken as a kind of manifesto.
Genette includes the preface-manifesto within his typology, citing Oscar Wilde’s The Portrait ofDorian Gray and Joseph Conrad’s preface to
The Nigger ofthe “Narcissus” (228-29). Indeed, in “Borges: Una teoria,”
Emir Rodriguez Monegal asserts just such a status for the prologue to
La invention, noting that it appears at the end of a period of reflection
embodied in the essays of Discusion and Historia de la eternidad and
preceding the appearance of the groundbreaking Jardin de senderos que
se bifurcan (183).7 It is at least ironic that Borges should have defined
his own fictional practice in the course of introducing another writer’s
work. For Rodriguez Monegal, the prologue lays out the fundamental
Borgesian approach to writing, “a theory,” as his subtitle indicates, that
will henceforth ground Borges’s practice: “todo es ficcion y entre la simulation psicologica o realista es preferible el rigor, la lucidez, la causalidad magica de la literatura fantastica” (189). For Rodriguez Monegal,
Borges’s polemic with Ortega points out the artificiality of psychology
and realism, in general, and maintains the superiority of fantastical
artificiality. The assertion that “todo es ficcion” finds little justification
in the prologue to La invention, although Borges’s casual mix of literary
and philosophical references might point in that direction. In any case,
not only has the prefatory text become a part of the novel; providing
its guiding poetics as a sort of manifesto, the prologue would seem to
escape the orbit of the text proper, functioning independendy as a blueprint to Borges’s writing, and possibly that of a larger circle of Argentine
and Latin American writers.8
It would be no exaggeration to say that Rodriguez Monegal
celebrates Borges’s elimination of the difference between literature and
philosophy in the proposition that “todo es ficcion.” He even suggests
that Borges’s assertion provided a basic premise for French postwar

thought (189). However, Borges’s prologue does nor make this claim,
staging, instead, an encounter between a particular fiction and a philosophical debate about invention and knowledge, asserting along the
way that La invention already, in advance of its prologue, combines
imagination and reason in a unique, innovative way. Such a hybrid
discourse does not eliminate the difference between the enunciation
of the prologue and the novel, although it certainly ought to motivate
us to question this difference. If fiction has a potential for engaging in
philosophical debates, the prologue represents the direct, predicative
mode of what the novel, by definition, must intertwine with fantasy
and indirection. Genette’s survey of paratexts not only renders explicit
the common features of prefaces but also calls attention to the inherent
strangeness of prefaces’ liminal character, struggling with its commitment to originality and commentary, attempting to claim significance
for its apparently superfluous status. Borges’s prologue largely conforms
to conventions, discussing real people and working in an argumentative,
at times laudatory, discourse. In order to reckon, then, with the other
inventive elements, I would like to turn to another touchstone for the
theory of the prologue.
As indicated by the title listed in the table of contents to Dissemination, “Outwork, prefacing” and the long list of near synonyms
that appear as a title before the English text, Jacques Derrida opens his
book with a strange rumination on the place and function of prefatory
discourses.9 Genette’s characterization of “Outworks” as a “self-referential” preface fails to appreciate the wide implications of the piece, questioning the privilege of consciousness for interpretation and the very
philosophy of reflection that grounds this privilege.10 Derrida surveys a
number of autographic prologues to philosophical and literary works
and presents a number of clear formulations that constitute a theory of
the preface; moreover, he ties his inquiry to the larger concerns of his
oeuvre. But beyond these conventional prefatory gestures, “Outworks”
serves as an occasion to question the relationship between primary
and secondary, autonomous and ancillary, inventive and synthetic
texts. Indeed, Derrida explicitly disavows a prefatory intention: “This
is not a preface, at least not if by preface we mean a table, a code, an
annotated summary of prominent signifieds, or an index of key words
or of proper names” (8). Although “Outworks” mentions key terms
discussed in the other essays in Derrida’s oeuvre and in Dissemination,

in particular—including “dissemination,” “double science/session,” the
“pharmakon,” and “deconstruction”—this prologue does not represent
a neutral summation of previous achievements. Ironically, this warning
still fulfills Genette’s axiom that a prologue strives to “get the book read
properly” (197). After discussing the prefatory gestures in Lautreamont’s
Les Chants de Maldoror, Derrida offers a dramatically different definition than the one Genette derives from his examples: “the preface, a
synthetic mode of exposition, a discourse of themes, theses and conclusions, here as always precedes the analytic text of invention, which
will in fact have come before it but which cannot, for fear of remaining
unreadable, present or teach itself on its own” (38). In spite of his earlier
renunciation of this prefatory gesture, Derrida indeed recapitulates the
three essays of Dissemination in “Outwork” while calling attention to
a paratextual convention that, rather than providing a sober enabling
function, creates a somewhat perverse illocutionary situation. The writer
composes the preface after the work proper and places the later text at
the beginning; in addition, what ought to serve the primary work actually preempts it.
Hence the “essential and ludicrous operation” that says to the
reader “you have not yet begun to read” (7). Derrida is no more de
terred than Borges from facing the “tarea casi imposible” mentioned in
the epilogue to the Libro de arena (Obras completas III: 82). Rather, the
former develops the notion of a “double writing” or “double science”
that inhabits conventional or institutional systems as the condition of
possibility for their destruction. The beginning of “Outwork” proposes
that the volume Dissemination might contribute to the “dismantling” of
the book (3) and acknowledges that the “deconstruction of philosophy”
must remain in a sense a “philosophical discourse” (4); this (non)preface
repeats the classical features of the preface in order to account for and
question the premises of the preface. “Outwork” operates as a preface in
order to practice a double writing that marks an inside and outside of a
“deconstructed system” that shapes our understanding of signification
in general (4). The stakes of deconstruction, then, are not limited to an
apparently restricted theme such as the preface, but the entire range of
philosophical inquiry and its consequences for the theoretical sciences
and political practice.
Derrida pays equal attention to literature and philosophy in
“Outwork” because in both cases the preface implies an exemption

from the struggle with meaning characteristic of philosophical and literary work, as if the prologue did not also need a kind of presentation
to make it readable. The preface ceases to be only a convention and
instead becomes apposite to a kind of double writing: “The question
of the preface, of the double inscription or double-jointed-ness of such
a text: its semantic envelopment within the book—the representative
of a Logos or Logic (ontotheology and absolute knowledge)—and the
left-overness [restance] of its textual exteriority” (44). The preface represents the prefaced work, but it also functions as an indicator of the
work’s irreducible relation to an outside or Other. In “Signature, Event,
Context,” one of his more programmatic works, Derrida describes the
sense in which “there is no outside the text,” by distinguishing “general
writing” from the conventional idea of writing as a record of possible
speech. “Everything is writing” because all phenomenality presumes the
essential traits of writing: all experience, communication, and writing
in its restricted sense must always already include a “mark that subsists”
apart from consciousness; it must be capable of reiteration without
complete loss of its signifying function; and it must include an element
of “spacing” that sets it apart as a meaningful unit in a signifying chain
(9). In Derrida’s philosophical examples from “Outworks,” prefatory
texts—works that are outside of works, or outworks—reiterate what
needs no repetition, acquiescing to conventions but Ending, also,
something to add to what was already complete in itself. The literary
prefaces, on the other hand, question the authority of the passage from
imagination to argumentation or creation to commentary. Prefatory
texts double, Derrida says: they repeat the work with the pretense of
introducing it in terms that guide and inspire an eventual reader. But
this doubling necessarily reveals that the author and the text are never
themselves; they remark the lack of autonomy and originality that, traditionally at least, justify their presentation in the first place.
Borges knew about the troubled relationship between identity
and invention, and the best work on his oeuvre has grappled with a
need to describe Borges’s singularity in relation to his vast project of
appropriation.11 In the prologue to La invention de Morel, this problem
makes an appearance via the various types of double writing. I have
noted the discursive features that differ from the first reading to the
second of the very same text. Examples of psychological inquiries that
contribute to Borges’s the polemic against the psychological novel, turn

out to be features of La invention de Morel. Furthermore, a cluster of
laconic allusions, on rereading, identifies the motif of cyclical time.
La invencion's unreliable narrator assures himself that the words of his
diary “permaneceran invariables” (11), but Borges’s prologue reminds
us that texts do not remain identical. Firstly, he explicitly reminds his
readers that he has read the text with an interest and eagerness that
Ortega had declared all but impossible, before rereading it with attention to the traits that justify his declaration of its perfection. Secondly,
in the prologue he encodes statements whose meanings change after
reading La invention. Though his insistence on citing titles in their
original languages might seem like a nod to the authority of the author’s
imprimatur, Borges’s departure from English and French conventions
regarding capitalization of titles reminds us of the subtle changes that
texts undergo through quotation. It might also be said that Borges’s
insistence on his close relationship with Bioy accomplishes a kind of
doubling that lends his allographic prologue all the interpretive authority of an autographic one, while allowing enough distance to include
effective praise for the author.
Borges’s prologue inscribes the novel within a tradition that
includes philosophy and literature, a process that Bioy engages from the
book’s title onward. Suzanne Jill Levine has analyzed the novel’s echoes
of H. G. Wells’s The Island ofDoctor Moreau and “a whole tradition of
utopic island literature” (17), noting veiled allusions to Montesquieu
(22) and Twain (25n4). Considering the abundance of literary and philosophical allusions in the novel, and the narrator-protagonist’s classical
belief in the immortality conferred by writing, Levine’s characterization
of Bioy’s world as “a bookish reality” (25n4) seems to justify her agreement with Rodriguez Monegal that Borges anticipates the “French”
critique of philosophy.12 Borges’s prologue, however, should be seen as
an intensification of what the novelist himself began, quoting passages
from Ortega to Santiago Dabove so that La invention might be quoted
in its turn by world-renowned philosophers and local writers whose
work has been “olvidado con injusticia” (vii). Each of the references in
the prologue provides a new context within which the authors and their
work receives at least an implicit interpretation, sometimes departing
from the conventional reading, as when James’s and Kafka’s works are
read as “novelas de peripecias” (v).

These interpretations, moreover, vary for readers who do and
do not yet have familiarity with La invention. Ortega appears less ob
noxious, less tyrannical in light of the psychological features of Borges’s
novel. One pauses, even dwells on the qualifying adverbs in quotations
from Ortega—“es muy diffcil . . .”, “es practicamente imposible” (qtd.
in Prologo v)—wondering whether Borges intended to suggest that
narrative invention could be easy and abundant if writers embraced
rigorous artifice. The slight misattribution of the Ortega quotes points
out the irony of the Spanish philosopher’s engagement with art and
literature: although he diagnoses increasingly calculated, inhuman pro
cedures in the arts, he foresees a future for narrative only in a return to
the human in psychology. Borges and his friend Bioy, by contrast, insist
that invention occurs through careful, reasoned construction in light
of the ideas and models of predecessors. Such a procedure could also
be called impersonal, or even, to use the term that Ortega preferred,
dehumanized. Indeed, if we look for an index of the equation of the
author not with his flesh and blood but with his written words, the
prologue to La invention offers it in the rigorous avoidance of providing
both titles of works and the names of authors. Instead, for example, we
find mention of Las fuerzas extranas but not of Leopoldo Lugones, of
Marcel Proust but not of A la recherche du temps perdu. Writing acts like
Morel’s device, turning people into an archival record of their own lives.
Borges does not explain how invention happens. He only
speculates on the conditions in which a writer might produce something truly original. In addition, he argues and provides evidence that
inventive writing continues to appear, even in what he calls, with an
irony for which he has prepared us, “este siglo que no puede inventar
argumentos” (vi). He praises Bioy for inventing mysteries and resolving
them, but the enigma of invention does not admit solution. Borges’s
prologue asks, in the most conventional way, how we can explain La
invention. Normally, one does so by referring to the brilliance of the
author and the intricacy, originality or timelessness of the work’s meaning. But Borges also raises the question, how can we account for la
invention? We might even read a slight multilingual pun into the title,
“the invention of more,” and ask, how do we account for ongoing,
persistent, rather than diminishing invention? Let me note that the
three privileged titles he evokes in the prologue are all, strictly speaking, inconclusive stories. Le Voyageur sur terre fails to determine whether

Daniel O’Donovan went insane or was driven to suicide by ghosts. The
Turn of the Screw will even serve the theorist of the fantastic Tzvetan
Todorov as an example of “texts which sustain their ambiguity to the
very end, i.e., even beyond the narrative itself” (43). In his gloss, the
novella “does not permit us to determine finally whether ghosts haunt
the old estate, or whether we are confronted by the hallucinations of a
hysterical governess victimized by the disturbing atmosphere which sur
rounds her” (43). Der Prozess, for its part, never enlightens the reader or
Josef K. about the charges brought against him. We may even wonder
whether they are not a tawdry prosecutorial conspiracy or paranoid
fantasy which engulf his life and seem to bring about his death. La
invention de Morel seems to leave readers with clarity as to the origins
of the narrator-protagonist’s confusion and his means of resolving his
dilemmas. The solution turns out to have been announced in the very
title of the novel. Between the covers of this book, then, the work that
most resembles the three novels’ “argumentos” is Borges’s prologue.
By following the conventions, a prologue approximates a liter
ary work to philosophy and begins to appropriate it for a philosophi
cal discourse of proposition and argument. While Borges fulfills this
convention in his prologue to La invention de Morel, he performs other
discursive gestures that emphasize the prologue’s collusion with literary
texts, with their indirection, attention to language, inscription in an
oeuvre and a tradition, and their responsiveness to rereading. We should
be careful not to overstate Borges’s accomplishment, as if a single writer
could overthrow the millennial institutional division between literature
and philosophy in the double writing of his prologues. Instead, the pro
logue to La invention asserts the possibility of inscribing literature into
philosophy, and vice versa, and thus discovers not only what literature
has to gain from philosophy but what philosophy has to learn from
literature. Borges implicitly accepts invention as a part of philosophy,
going so far as to entertain the idea that metaphysics is “una rama de
literatura fantastica” (Obras completas I: 467). But Borges has always insisted on his commitment to the mysterious inventiveness of literature,
even when apparently constrained by the conventions of the prologue.
Cleveland State University

NOTES
1 Although this prologue appears in the Obras completas (IV: 28—30), I will refer
throughout to the version included in a common, recent edition of the novel.
2 In an article that sets out to expound a Borgesian theory of the prologue, Walter
Bruno Berg makes much of Borges’s playful proposal to write a “series of prologues
to books that never existed,” concluding that Borges teaches us that no literary text
actually exists. Therefore, a Borges prologue, above all else, presents itself as a (literary)
text in its own right: “no es—en una palabra—un metatexto sino un texto literario
independiente y autonomo (con respecto al texto que le sirve de prologo)” (129). As
I will demonstrate in a detailed analysis of several prologues, Borges indeed expresses
a desire to preserve a certain autonomy of effect for the literary text. But my analysis
will also show that the prologue works on two levels and offers at least two readings,
before and after the prefaced text has been read. While it is true that the prologues
assume a sort of literariness that puts their very existence into question, Borgesian
literariness can hardly be said to be characterized by autonomy and independence.
Rather, literature constitutes itself by combining invention with a network of histori
cal and cultural references and linguistic raw material. Any particular text, in fact, is
practically nothing without other texts.

3 Although it refers to contemporary Spanish examples in the introduction, A. Porqueras Mayo’s Elprologo como genero literario deliberately focuses on the Spanish Golden
Age, relying not only on observation about the prologue’s characteristics, but also on
definitions from the Diccionario de la Real Academia Espanola and the author’s own
intuition (47). Porqueras Mayo asserts that “los pro logos son mas importantes en
Espana que en otros paises, porque nuestra literatura esta atravesada, como ha sido
tantas veces demostrado, por una constante veta popular” (15). Genette’s wide-ranging
study certainly documents the variety and the importance of prologues outside of
Spain, including the European and Anglo-American canon, with a few examples of
Latin American literature, from the classical period to the 1970s.
In a recent article, Eva Alvarez Ramos confirms the basic characteristics out
lined by Genette by a survey of canonical Hispanic autographic prologues. Compared
to Genette, Alvarez Ramos’s study fails to capture the variety of prefatory practices,
but it also highlights the unconventional aspects of Borges’s prologue to La invention.
In spite of the predominance of examples by Miguel de Unamuno, and although she
certainly makes interesting parallels between conventional twentieth-century prologues
and classical rhetoric, she shows no interest in the uncanniness of the prologue.
Berg dismisses Genette’s study for considering the prologue as “un fenomeno de mera tecnica—en vez de teoria” (128). Though Paratexts may often seem a
mere enumeration of frequent characteristics of canonical texts, it serves as an effort
to determine the particularity of the preface as a discursive form. Such, at least, is a
perfectly legitimate theoretical definition of theory.

4 I preserve the use of upper- and lower-case letters as it is in the Penguin edition. In
the Obras completas, the printing is slightly different for the first and last titles, though
still with imperfect application of the conventions for capitalization in the English
title and the French title: The turn of the Screw . . . Le Voyageur sur la Terre (Obras
completas IV: 29).
5 Daniel Bautistas perceptive reading of the unit formed by Borges’s prologue and Bioy’s
novel equates, unfortunately, an attack on the psychological novel, or, rather, on its
importance for the future of the novel, with a dismissal of all psychological elements of
fiction. Thus he finds Borges’s example of “suicidas por felicidad” merely ironic (408),
part of the way in which the meaning of Bioy and Borges’s art, like Morel’s, “escape
(their) intentions” (413). In light of “La supersticiosa etica del lector,” we can see a
true irony: that Borges was aware of the way texts escape the intentions of the writer,
and tried, nonetheless, to fill them with all kinds of determinate textual mechanisms,
like the references in the prologue that only become apparent on rereading. More
directly, Borges begins his prologue to Ana Maria Barrenechea’s book about him by
saying that it “has taught [him] many things about himself. . . . [T]here are many
things in an author’s work not intended and only partially understood by him” (vii).

6 This is Ortega’s express purpose in the Envio (that is, in the preface) of Ideas sobre la
novela, the work that Borges actually quotes in the prologue to La invention, while
attributing the words to La deshumanizacion del arte.

7 Ana Maria Barrenechea’s chronology of Borges’s work does not support the story
that Rodriguez Monegal tells of the emergence of an innovative fantastical literature,
whose practice coincides with the pronouncement of “imaginacion razonada” in the
prologue. See Barrenechea 14—15.
8 In addition to Rodriguez Monegal, a series of critics have treated Borges and Bioy as
a single signifying unit. Bautista gives a useful gloss of Hebe Monge’s Introduction to
the Colohue edition of the novel, describing its standard interpretation “in terms of
the same ‘universal’ or metaphysical themes that characterize much of Borges’s own
work” (405). It is also noteworthy that, although one might expect all but autographic
prologues to be updated from one edition to the next, and substituted for others in
translation, editions of La invention invariably include Borges’s prologue before the
novel.
Borges mentions contemporaries Santiago Dabove and Leopoldo Lugones
in his prologue, and one could certainly include the co-editor of the Antologia de
literature fantastica, Silvina Ocampo, in a close circle of associates. It is, of course,
commonplace to consider the genre of the fantastic characteristic of Latin American
narrative in the mid-twentieth century. For a review of authors for whom Borges’s
“teoria de lo fantastico” would be formative, see Cynthia Duncan (1—11).
9 This is not a feature of La Dissemination, in which the title preceding the texts, “Hors
livre: prefaces,” matches word for word the one in the table of contents, by French
convention listed at the end of the book.

10 In The Tain ofthe Mirror, Rodolphe Gasche has carefully critiqued the conventional
caricatures of Derrida and deconstruction as heightened critical self-reflection, radical
skepticism, and negation of philosophical universality in the name of the polysemia
of (literary) writing. More recently, Audrey Wasser’s The Work of Difference reminds
us that such an interpretation of Derrida owes much to the Romantic notion of selfreflection that accompanied the formation of literary studies as a discipline in the
nineteenth century.
11 To name only a few outstanding examples, Ronald Christ’s study of Borges’s allusions, Sylvia Molloy’s account of Borges’s culture, and David Johnson’s readings of
Borges’s philosophers manage to illuminate the connection between the man’s vast
learning and his literary invention.
In Unthinking Thinking, Floyd Merrill notes Barrenechea’s claim that Borges’s
impression of mastery gives way to a larger relinquishment of knowledge of the universe (xi). The doubling implied by his intriguing title ought not be limited by the
ambiguity he draws out of it: “It implies either the project of unthinking traditional
Western thought, or, paradoxically, thinking without there being any accompanying
process of thought (an inevitably abortive attempt by sheer intellection to approach a
mystical insight)” (x). By focusing on physics, logic, and mathematics, Merrill aligns
Borges with positivist relinquishment of metaphysics in favor of science, rather than
a Derridean inquiry into the possibility and impossibility of the metaphysical tradition. Whatever the merits of that approach, Merrill’s hunch that Borges’s “denial of
any and all interpretations” resembles Derrida, betrays an excessively negative notion
of deconstruction (xiii).

12 Citing Derrida, Levine refers to Levi-Strauss’s characterization of science as a “myth,”
implying a simple negation of its pretense to objectivity (20). Later, she refers to the
apparent mockery in Bioy’s Plan de evasion and in Borges and Bioy’s collaborations
of “the pseudo-concepts of the original and of authorship” (24). Although we might
accept, with Rodriguez Monegal, that literary men anticipated post-structuralist critiques of traditional grounds for interpretation, none of these concepts is simply false
or dispensable. Indeed, a certain adherence to the idea of original creation inscribed
in the proper names Borges and Bioy, in addition to some implicit criteria of validity,
remain important enabling concepts for literary studies in the wake of French poststructuralism.
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